If the CCS hash of the polling location's results match, the votes are confirmed.

Polling Location: 25 Good School
Final Code: ZT235LKNB422PQRC9
Date: March 4, 2014

Polls Close

The election judge in each polling location randomly chooses a device to transport to the Central Counting Station (CCS) for download.

A receipt of the vote that contains a unique hash code prints with the ballot. The code is a mathematical computation of the voter’s choices expressed in an alpha-numeric string (Example: HV12352756BRK84). The voter takes this home for later online verification.

Prior to securing the device for transport, the judge prints one hash code that represents all votes for that location. This polling location hash is transmitted to CCS for comparison.

If the CCS hash of the polling location’s results match, the votes are confirmed.

Voter gets access code from ballot control station.

Voter casts an encrypted electronic ballot. It is saved to all of the devices in the polling location.

Paper ballot prints out at the voter’s voting station with a 1-D barcoded serial number at top and bottom.

A diverse group of Election Trustees are appointed and each given possession of a laptop. When a specified number of laptops are connected to the central tabulation computer, they act like a key to unlock and tally the encrypted ballots.

Central Counting Station

Travis STAR Voting System Workflow Diagram

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If a voter does not put a ballot in the ballot box, it is considered “spoiled,” and becomes part of a live parallel testing process. The voter may choose to take the ballot home to test the system themselves, or they may leave the ballot with the judge at the polling location. It is marked as “spoiled” and may be saved for parallel testing by the ballot board. According to Texas law, a voter may spoil up to 3 ballots.

After the election but before the canvass, the trustees reconvene at the final ballot board for late mail, accepting provisional ballots, and performing a risk limiting audit. Using a statistical model based on the number of votes cast and the margins in each race, a specified number of ballots are randomly pulled and the content of the ballots are matched up to their electronic counterparts. The correct number of trustees must be present to use their laptop “keys” to decrypt the specified electronic ballots. If all audited ballots match, there is a high statistical confidence that all ballots were cast and counted as intended.

After results are posted, the images of the spoiled ballots are posted online. A voter may match the retained spoiled ballot to the image online to prove that the system correctly recorded the electronic version of the ballot. Ballots not retained by voters may be validated by the ballot board.

Verification

Risk Limiting Audit